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Abstract
We address the problem of existence of the uniform value in recur-
sive games. We give two existence results. (i) The uniform value is
shown to exist if the state space is countable, the action sets are ﬁnite
and if, for some a > 0, there are ﬁnitely many states in which the
limsup value is less than a. (ii) For games with non-negative payoﬀ
function, it is suﬃcient that the action set of player 2 is ﬁnite. The
ﬁniteness assumption can be further weakened.
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11 Introduction
Two player stochastic games are played in stages. At every stage the game
is in some state of the world. Each player, given the whole history, chooses
an action independently of the other. The current state together with the
pair of actions determine a daily payoﬀ for player 1, as well as a probability
distribution according to which a new state of the world is chosen.
The goal of player 1 is to maximize the expected overall payoﬀ, and the
goal of player 2 is to minimize the expected overall payoﬀ (note that we did
not deﬁne yet the “overall payoﬀ”. In a moment we will see several possible
deﬁnitions).
Under very mild assumptions the n-stage game — that is, the game
where the overall payoﬀ is the average of the daily payoﬀs of the ﬁrst n stages
— has a value vn. When the overall payoﬀ of the players is the λ-discounted
sum of the inﬁnite sequence of daily payoﬀs, existence of the value vλ was
proven under some continuity conditions on the transition probability (see,
e.g., Nowak (1984a,b, 1985) or Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994))
In both cases, the optimal strategies of the players depend crucially on
the parameter, the length of the game or the discount factor. A strategy
that is optimal for one parameter may yield a low payoﬀ for a diﬀerent
parameter.
A stochastic game has a uniform value v∞ if limn→∞ vn exists, it is
equal to v∞, and for every ε there exist a positive integer n0 and a pair
of strategies (σε,τε) for the two players, each is ε-optimal in every n-stage
game, provided n ≥ n0.
It can be shown that in this case σε and τε are 2ε-optimal in every dis-
counted game, provided that the discount factor is suﬃciently small. That
is, if v∞ exists then v∞ = limn→∞ vn = limλ→0 vλ.
Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved that if the state and action spaces
are ﬁnite then the game has a uniform value. Their proof uses the fact
that the function λ → vλ has bounded variation (see Bewley and Kohlberg
(1976) for this result).
If the state space or actions spaces are general, then this function needs
not have bounded variation, hence the proof of Mertens and Neyman fails.
Another value that was studied in the literature is the limsup value. The
limsup value is the value of the game in which the overall payoﬀ to player 1
is the limsup of the daily payoﬀs.
Maitra and Sudderth (1993) proved that the limsup value v exists under
very mild assumptions. It is easy to see that if the uniform value exists then
v = v∞.
2Lehrer and Sorin (1992) gave an example of a Markov decision process
(with countable state space) where limn→∞ vn and limλ→0 vλ exist and diﬀer,
and they both diﬀer from the limsup value v.
Recursive games are stochastic games where the state space is divided
into two sets S and T — non-absorbing states and absorbing states. As long
as the game is in S, the payoﬀ is 0, whatever the players play. Once the
game reaches a state in T, it remains in it with probability 1, whatever the
players play.
Recursive games were introduced by Everett (1957) who proved the ex-
istence of the limsup value v and of stationary ε-optimal strategies, when
the state space and the action sets are ﬁnite.
In the present paper we provide conditions under which the uniform value
exists in recursive games. First, we investigate games with countable state
space and ﬁnite action sets. For such games, Secchi (1997) gave conditions
under which one of the players has a stationary ε-optimal strategy (in the
limsup sense), but his strategies need not be ε-optimal in a uniform sense.
We prove that if the limsup value is positive on S, and bounded away from
zero, then the uniform value exists. We use this result to show that if, for
some a > 0, there are only ﬁnitely many states in S where the limsup value
is less than a, the game admits a uniform value.
We then show that if the game is positive — that is, if the payoﬀ in
absorbing states is always non-negative — then the assumptions on the state
space and the limsup value can be dropped, and it is enough to require that
the action set of player 2 is ﬁnite. This ﬁniteness assumption can be further
weakened. It is enough that for every ε > 0 and every state s ∈ S player 2
has a mixed action that is ε-optimal in the game with continuation payoﬀ
limsupλ→0 vλ, and this ε-optimal strategy guarantees he pays (on average)
at most limsupλ→0 vλ(s) + ε in this one shot game.
The result of Rosenberg and Vieille (1998), who study recursive games
with incomplete information, imply that if the values of the discounted
games converge uniformly (over the state space) as the discount factor goes
to zero then the uniform value exists. Their results are independent of ours.
2 The Model and the Main Results
A recursive game is described by:
• a measurable state space Ω = S ∪ T;
• topological action sets A and B for the two players;
3• a transition function q from S × A × B to Ω;
• a bounded measurable payoﬀ function g : T → R.
The game is played as follows. An initial state s1 is given. At any stage
n ≥ 1, the current state sn is told to the players, the players choose actions
an and bn, possibly at random, and the next state sn+1 is drawn according
to q(·|sn,an,bn). Once the game reaches a state s ∈ T, player 1 receives
from player 2 a stage payoﬀ g(s), and the game remains in s forever.
It is usually important to specify what each player knows in any given
stage about the past play of the other player. This is irrelevant for our
result: the ε-optimal strategies that we construct have the feature that what
a player does depends only on the sequence of states visited so far (including
the current one). Therefore, provided the information available to a player
enables him to recover this sequence, our results holds. For simplicity, we
assume that, in any stage, each player knows the entire past play.
2.1 Strategies
A and B are endowed with the σ-ﬁelds of Borel sets. The set of histories
of length n is Hn = Ω × (A × B × Ω)n−1, and the set of ﬁnite histories
is H = ∪n∈NHn, where N is the set of positive integers. The set of plays
is H∞ = (Ω × A × B)N. It is convenient to identify any hn ∈ Hn with a
cylinder set of H∞. The σ-algebra induced by Hn over H∞ is denoted by
Hn: it is the information available to the players at stage n. The product
σ-ﬁeld on H∞ is H∞ = σ(Hn,n ≥ 1).
We let ∆(A) and ∆(B) denote the sets of probability measures over A
and B, endowed with the weak-∗ topology.
A strategy of player 1 is a map σ : H → ∆(A), (such that the restriction
of σ to Hn is measurable), with the interpretation that σn(hn) is the lottery
used by player 1 to choose his action at stage n, if the history of play
up to stage n is hn. It is called pure if σ(hn) is a unit mass, for every
hn ∈ H. A strategy σ can be equivalently viewed as a sequence (σn)n≥1,
where σn : (H∞,Hn) → ∆(A) is measurable with respect to Hn. Strategies
of player 2 are deﬁned analogously.
A strategy σ is stationary if σ(hn) depends only on the current state
sn. Thus, a stationary strategy reduces to a family (x(s),s ∈ S), where
x(s) ∈ ∆(A) is the mixed move played whenever the current state is s.1
1This diﬀers from the terminology used in gambling theory, where these strategies are
called stationary families.
4The letters σ (resp. x) will always stand for a strategy (resp. stationary
strategy) of player 1. τ and y stand for strategies and stationary strategies
of player 2. The sets of strategies of the two players are denoted by S and
T .
We denote by Ps,σ,τ the law of play when the initial state is s, and the
players follow the strategies σ and τ: Ps,σ,τ is a probability distribution over
(H∞,H∞). Expectation w.r.t. Ps,σ,τ is denoted by Es,σ,τ.
Let t = inf{n ≥ 1,sn ∈ T} be the termination stage, and set gn =
g(st)1t≤n (payoﬀ at stage n). Finally, denote by gn = 1
n
Pn
p=1 gp the average
payoﬀ up to stage n.
We assume w.l.o.g. that k g k∞≤ 1.
2.2 Payoﬀs and value
Two notions of value have been studied in the literature. The ﬁrst is based
on the payoﬀ function γ : S × S × T → R, deﬁned as
γ(s,σ,τ) = Es,σ,τ[limsupgn] = Es,σ,τ[g(st)1t<+∞].










A strategy of player 1 which achieves the sup up to ε in the supinf is
called ε-optimal. We say that such a strategy guarantees v − ε.
We recall a result, which is a particular case of the result of Maitra and
Sudderth (1993).
Theorem 2 (Maitra-Sudderth) Assume that (i) Ω, A and B are Borel
subsets of Polish spaces, (ii) B is compact, (iii) g is bounded and upper
analytic,2 (iv) q(E | s,a,·) is Borel measurable, and continuous over B for
every s ∈ S, every a ∈ A and every E ⊆ Ω. Then v exists, and it is an
upper analytic function.
The second notion of value requires uniformity. Deﬁne γn(s,σ,τ) =
Es,σ,τ[gn], the expected average payoﬀ during the ﬁrst n stages.
Deﬁnition 3 Let w : Ω → R. We say that player 1 uniformly guarantees
w if for every s ∈ Ω and every ε > 0 there exists σε ∈ S and N ∈ N, such
that
∀n ≥ N,∀τ ∈ T ,γn(s,σε,τ) ≥ w(s) − ε
2That is, the set {g > c} is analytic for every c ∈ R.
5We also say that the strategy σε uniformly guarantees w − ε. Similarly,
player 2 uniformly guarantees w if for every s ∈ Ω and every ε > 0 there
exists τε ∈ T and N ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ N,∀σ ∈ S,γn(s,σ,τε) ≤ w(s) + ε
Deﬁnition 4 v∞ : Ω → R is the uniform value of the game if both players
uniformly guarantee v∞.
A strategy that uniformly guarantees v∞−ε is called uniform ε-optimal.
We point out that our deﬁnition is weaker than the deﬁnition in Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir (1994), in that we allow N to depend on the initial state s.
By dominated convergence, limn γn(s,σ,τ) = γ(s,σ,τ). Therefore, if the
uniform value exists, it coincides with the limsup value.
The value of the n-stage game, that is the game with payoﬀ function
γn(s,σ,τ), is denoted by vn.












denote the λ-discounted evaluation of payoﬀs.










Existence of the discounted value and the n-stage value was proved in a
general setup (see, e.g., Nowak (1984a,b, 1985) or Mertens, Sorin and Zamir
(1994) Proposition VII.1.4).
Theorem 6 If Ω is Borel, A and B are compact, g is measurable, and for
every S0 ⊆ Ω, the function q(S0 | ω,a,b) is measurable and continuous over
A × B for each ﬁxed ω, then vn and vλ exist. Moreover, for every s ∈ S,
vλ(s) = (1 − λ)valGs(vλ) and vλ is measurable.
By the deﬁnition of the uniform value, whenever it exists we have v∞ =
limn→∞ vn. One can also show that in that case v∞ = limλ→0 vλ.
62.3 Known results
In this subsection we review conditions under which the uniform value is
known to exist.
The ﬁrst result, which was proved for general stochastic games, was given
by Mertens and Neyman (1981).
Theorem 7 (Mertens and Neyman, 1981) If the function λ → vλ has
bounded variation, then v∞ exists.
In Rosenberg and Vieille (1998), recursive games with incomplete infor-
mation are studied. Their result implies the next theorem.
Theorem 8 (Rosenberg and Vieille, 1998) If vλ converge uniformly to
a limit, then v∞ exists.
Finally, when the transition to states in S is independent of the actions
of the players, one can drop the requirement on vλ. Formally, the next result
is a by-product of the last section of Rosenberg et al (1999).
Theorem 9 (Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille, 1999) If (i) A and B are
ﬁnite, and (ii) for every s ∈ S and every S0 ⊆ S we have
q(S0|s,a,b)q(S|s,a0,b0) = q(S0 | s,a0,b0)q(S | s,a,b) ∀(a,b),(a0,b0) ∈ A × B
then v∞ exists.
2.4 Results and example
Our main result gives a condition on the limsup value that ensures the
existence of v∞.
Theorem 10 Assume that Ω is countable and A and B are ﬁnite. If the
set {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ a} is ﬁnite for some a > 0, the uniform value exists.
If the function g happens to be non-negative, then the only condition
that is required is that B is ﬁnite.
Theorem 11 If (i) g ≥ 0, (ii) vλ exists for every λ ∈ (0,1), and (iii) B is
ﬁnite, then the uniform value exists.
One can replace the condition that B is ﬁnite by the following weaker
condition.
7Theorem 12 If (i) g ≥ 0, (ii) vλ exists for every λ ∈ (0,1), and (iii) For
every ε > 0 there exists a stationary strategy yε = (yε




s) ≤ w(s) + ε ∀a ∈ A,s ∈ S,
where w(s) = limsupλ→0 vλ(s), then the uniform value exists.
As we will see, if g ≥ 0 then for every s ∈ S, vλ(s) increases when λ
decreases. Thus, w(s) = supλ∈(0,1) vλ(s).
For each s ∈ S, yε
s is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2 in the one
shot game with payoﬀ
R
w(s0)dq(s0 | s,·,·). If B is ﬁnite, then any limit of
discounted ε-optimal strategies in this game (as the discount factor and ε
go to 0), satisﬁes (iii).
We give now an example that shows that Theorem 10 is in some respect
tight. The example is of a game for which the set {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ 0} is empty,
but which has no uniform value.
Example 13
The state space is S = {1,2,3,...}∪{t1,t−1,t2}∪{1?,2?,...}. Player 1
has a single action, and player 2 has two actions, {D,R}. Since player 1 is
degenerate, we omit him from the notations. States t1,t−1,t2 are absorbing,
with absorbing payoﬀ 1,-1,2 respectively. The transition function is given
by:
P((k − 1)?|k?,·) = 1 k > 1
P(t2|1?,·) = 1
P(t−1|k,D) = 1/2 k ≥ 1
P(k?|k,D) = 1/2 k ≥ 1
P(t1|k,R) = 1/2k+4 k ≥ 1
P(k + 1|k,R) = 1 − 1/2k+4 k ≥ 1
Graphically, the game looks as follows:
8If the game reaches a state k?, then after k stages it reaches state t2
with probability 1. Hence v(k?) = 2 for every k. Since
P∞
k=1 1/2k+4 =
1/16, it follows that if the initial state is k, then the optimal strategy for
player 2 is to play R forever. Hence v(k) = 1/2k+3. We shall now see that
limsupn→∞ vn(1) ≤ −1/8. Indeed, for a given n ∈ N, consider the following
strategy of player 2: play R for the ﬁrst n/2 stages, and then play L once
(afterwards, transitions are independent of the actions played by player 2).























3 Construction of an ε-Optimal Strategy
In this section we consider a recursive game that satisﬁes the following as-
sumptions:
A.1 The limsup value v exists, and the function s 7→ v(s) is measurable.
A.2 There exists a stationary strategy x = (xs) for player 1 such that for




v(s0)dq(t0 | s,xs,b) ∀b ∈ B.
A.3 There exists a stationary strategy y = (ys) for player 2 such that for




v(s0)dq(t0 | s,a,ys) ∀a ∈ A.
Thus, for every s ∈ S the pair of strategies (xs,ys) is optimal in the
one-shot game with continuation payoﬀ v.
Note that conditions A.1-A.3 hold under the assumptions of Theorem
10.
We are going to construct a speciﬁc ε-optimal strategy for player 1.
By symmetry, a similar construction would yield an ε-optimal strategy for
player 2. In the next section, we shall argue that under the assumptions of
Theorem 10, these strategies are indeed uniformly ε-optimal.
Section 3.1 gives some results on the concatenation of ε-optimal strate-
gies. Section 3.2 deals with recursive games in which the limsup value is
bounded away from zero. Section 3.3 deals with general recursive games.
93.1 Preliminary results
We ﬁrst deﬁne terminating strategies
Deﬁnition 14 We say that σ ∈ S is terminating if, for every initial state
s and every τ ∈ T , t < +∞, Ps,σ,τ-a.s.
For every strategy σ ∈ S and every ﬁnite history hn = (s1,a1,b1,...,sn) ∈
Hn, we denote by σhn the strategy induced by σ in the subgame deﬁned by
hn : for every ﬁnite history h, σhn(h) = σ(s1,...,sn−1,an−1,bn−1,h).
Let σ1,σ2 ∈ S, and u be a stopping time, with values in N ∪ {+∞}.
We deﬁne the strategy σ1uσ2 as: play σ1 up to u, then switch to σ2
(and forget the history up to u). Formally, for every n ∈ N and every
hn = (s1,a1,b1,... ,sn), (σ1uσ2)(hn) = σ1(hn) if u > n, and (σ1uσ2)(hn) =
σ2(hu
n) if u ≤ n, where hu
n stands for the ﬁnite history (su,au,bu,... ,sn).
Similarly, if 0 < u1 < u2 < u3 < ··· are stopping times and σ1,σ2,...
are strategies, we deﬁne the strategy σ = σ1u1σ2u2 ··· as follows. σ(hn) =
σ1(hn) if n < u1, and σ(hn) = σm(h
um−1
n ) if um−1 ≤ n < um.
We start by checking that the concatenation of two ε-optimal strategies
is 2ε-optimal (Corollary 16).
Lemma 15 Let σ1 be an ε-optimal strategy and s ∈ S. Let u be a stopping
time. Assume that for each τ, u < +∞, Ps,σ1,τ-a.s. One has
∀τ ∈ T , Es,σ1,τ[v(su)] ≥ v(s) − ε.
Proof. Otherwise, Es,σ1,τ[v(su)] < v(s) − ε − η for some τ ∈ T and
η > 0. Let τ1 be an η-optimal strategy of player 2. One has
γs(σ1,τuτ1) = Es,σ1,τ[γsu(σhu,τ1)] ≤ Es,σ1,τ[v(su) + η] < v(s) − ε,
a contradiction.
Corollary 16 Let σ1 and σ2 be respectively ε1- and ε2- optimal strategies
of player 1. Let u be a stopping time with Ps,σ1,τ-a.s. ﬁnite values, for every
τ. Then σ1uσ2 is ε1 + ε2-optimal.
Proof. Observe that





≥ Es,σ1,τ [v(su) − ε2]
≥ v(s) − ε1 − ε2,
10where the ﬁrst inequality uses the ε2-optimality of σ2, and the second one
uses Lemma 15.
3.2 Recursive games with limsup value bounded away from
0
In this section we prove the following result.
Proposition 17 Let Γ be a recursive game such that, for some a > 0,
v(s) ≥ a, for each s ∈ S. Then player 1 has a terminating ε-optimal
strategy.
Observe that a recursive game that satisﬁes the condition of Proposition
17 need not be positive, and a positive recursive game need not satisfy the
condition of Proposition 17.
Fix a recursive game that satisﬁes the condition of Proposition 17, and
an ε > 0.
The proof of Proposition 17 goes as follows. For every m we choose
an ε/2m+1-optimal strategy σm for player 1. We deﬁne a strategy ¯ σ by a
suitable concatenation of the σm’s. We then prove that ¯ σ is terminating and
ε-optimal.
Given σ ∈ S, we deﬁne the stopping time
tσ = inf{n ≥ 1,inf
τ Ps,σ,τ(t < +∞|Hn) < ε}.
Equivalently, tσ(h∞) = inf{n ≥ 1,Psn,σhn,τ(t < +∞) < ε for some τ}. It
is the ﬁrst stage after which the residual probability of termination in ﬁnite
time is very small for some strategy of player 2.
Lemma 18 For every σ,τ, min(t,tσ) is Ps,σ,τ-ﬁnite.
Proof. Fix τ ∈ T and set t1 = inf{n ≥ 1,Ps,σ,τ(t < +∞|Hn) < ε}.
Clearly, t1 ≥ tσ, Ps,σ,τ-a.s., so it suﬃces to prove that min(t,t1) < +∞,
Ps,σ,τ-a.s.
Observe that the sequence (Ps,σ,τ(t < +∞|Hn))n is a martingale under
Ps,σ,τ, which converges Ps,σ,τ-a.s. to 1t<+∞, hence to 0 on the event {t =
+∞}. Therefore t1 < +∞ on the event {t = +∞}.
We need the following observation.
11Lemma 19 Let η > 0, and σ ∈ S be an η-optimal strategy. For every
s ∈ S,
inf
τ Ps,σ,τ(t < +∞) ≥ a − η
Proof. Fix τ ∈ T . Since the payoﬀ function g is bounded by 1, one has
a − η ≤ v(s) − η ≤ γ(s,σ,τ) = Es,σ,τ(g(st)1t<+∞) ≤ Ps,σ,τ(t < +∞),
as desired.
We obtain a terminating ε-optimal strategy σ of player 1 by concatena-
tion of ε/2n-optimal strategies. For every m ≥ 1, choose an ε/2m+1-optimal
strategy σm. We deﬁne inductively a sequence (σm) of strategies as follows.
Set σ1 = σ1. Assume that σm is deﬁned. We write tm instead of tσm. Set
σm+1 = σmtmσm+1.
In words, σ plays σ1 until the residual probability of termination in ﬁnite
time becomes very small. It then plays σ2 until the residual probability
becomes again very small, and so on up to inﬁnity.
Note that tm+1 > tm on the event {tm < +∞}, and in particular tm ≥ m.
Moreover, by Lemma 18, min{t,tm} is Ps,σm,τ-a.s. ﬁnite for every τ ∈ T ,
and therefore min{t,tm} is Ps,¯ σ,τ-a.s. ﬁnite as well. Hence σm+1 is well-
deﬁned and coincides with σm on Hm. We let σ be deﬁned by ¯ σ = σm on
Hm.
Lemma 20 σ is terminating.
Proof. Let τ ∈ T be arbitrary. For every m ∈ N, we have by Lemma
19 and the deﬁnition of tm
Ps,σm,τ(t ≤ tm) ≥ Ps,σmτ(t < +∞) − Ps,σmτ(tm < t < +∞) ≥ a − ε/2m+1 − ε.
As long as ε < a the result follows by the deﬁnition of ¯ σ.
Lemma 21 σ is ε-optimal.
Proof. By Corollary 16 and since min{t,tm} is Ps,¯ σ,τ-a.s. ﬁnite for every
ﬁxed τ ∈ T , σ1t1σ2 ···tm−1σm is ε/2+ε/4+···+ε/2m-optimal. Since σ is
terminating, γ(s,σ,τ) = limm→∞ γ(s,σm,τ) for every τ. In particular, σ is
ε-optimal.
We show on an example that the existence of a terminating strategy
relies crucially on the fact that v is uniformly bounded away from 0.
12Example 22 Consider the following game, with dummy players (a Markov
chain). T = {t1}, S = N, and g(t1) = 1. For every n ∈ N, q(t1|n) = 1
2n+2,
and q(n + 1|n) = 1 − q(t1|n). One has v(n) = Pn(t < +∞) = 1/2n+1 > 0
for every n ∈ N. However, whatever be the initial state, the probability that
the game does not terminate in ﬁnite time is strictly positive.
3.3 The general case
In this section, we let Γ be a general recursive game that satisﬁes assump-
tions A.1-A.3. Our goal is to construct ε-optimal strategies that are not
necessarily uniform ε-optimal. For every ε > 0 let Γ(ε) be the game
with (i) state space Ωε = Sε ∪ Tε, where Sε = {s ∈ S,v(s) ≥ 2ε} and
Tε = T ∪ {s ∈ S,v(s) < 2ε}, (ii) action spaces A and B, and (iii) payoﬀ
function that coincides with g on T and deﬁned as gε(s) = v(s) for s ∈ Tε.
(vi) Transitions on Sε are unchanged.
Intuitively, states with a value below 2ε are replaced by absorbing states
with payoﬀ which is equal to their limsup value.
Denote by ˜ v the limsup value of Γ(ε), and by ˜ vλ the λ-discounted value
of Γ(ε). As we show below, ˜ v = v, but vλ and ˜ vλ may diﬀer. In particular, it
will follow that for every s ∈ Sε, v(s) ≥ 2ε. Hence we can apply the results
from section 3.2 to Γ(ε). From now on we ﬁx ε > 0, and denote by ˜ γ the
payoﬀ in Γ(ε).
Let (αn) be a bounded process on (H∞,(Hn),P), and u ≤ u two stopping
times with values in N∪{+∞}. We say that (αn) is a submartingale between
u and u if, for each n, one has αn ≤ E(αn+1|Hn) on the event {u ≤ n < u}.
If (αn) is a submartingale between u and u, and ˜ u ≤ u is another stopping
time with P-a.s. ﬁnite values, E[α˜ u|Hu] ≥ αu on the event {u ≤ ˜ u}. We
say that (αn) is a submartingale up to u if it is a submartingale between 0
and u.
Lemma 23 ˜ v = v.
Proof. Let σ ∈ S be a terminating δ-optimal strategy in Γ(ε). Such
a strategy exists by the previous section. Set ˜ t = inf{n ≥ 1,sn ∈ Tε}. By
Lemma 15,
Es,σ,τ [v(s˜ t)] ≥ v(s) − δ ∀τ ∈ T .
13Since the left-hand side coincides with ˜ γ(s,σ,τ), this implies ˜ v(s) ≥ v(s)−δ.
Since δ is arbitrary, this yields ˜ v(s) ≥ v(s).
Fix s ∈ Sε. By assumption A.3, for each σ, the sequence (v(sn)) is
a (bounded) supermartingale under Ps,σ,y. Set v∞ = limn→∞ v(smin(n,˜ t)).
By the supermartingale property, Es,σ,y [v∞] ≤ v(s). By deﬁnition of Sε,
v∞ ≥ ε > 0 on the event ˜ t = +∞. Since v∞ = v(s˜ t) on the event ˜ t < +∞,
one obtains ˜ γ(s,σ,y) ≤ v(s). Hence ˜ v(s) ≤ v(s).
In particular, ˜ v(s) ≥ 2ε for every s ∈ Sε. For s ∈ Sε, we let σ∗(s) denote
a terminating ε2-optimal strategy for the initial state s, in the game Γ(ε).
Thus σ∗(s) guarantees v(s) − ε2 in Γ(ε).
The strategy we deﬁne now has some features in common with strategies
deﬁned in Rosenberg and Vieille (1998). Intuitively, it may be thought of as:
play x whenever the current state belongs to Tε; whenever the play enters
Sε, say in state s, switch to σ∗(s) until the play leaves Sε. As argued in
Rosenberg and Vieille (1998), this might involve too many switches. We
reﬁne this idea as follows.
Set u1 = 1, u2 = inf{n ≥ 1,v(sn) ≥ 2ε}. For p ∈ N, set u2p+1 = inf{n ≥
u2p,v(sn) ≤ ε}, and u2p+2 = inf{n ≥ u2p+1,v(sn) ≥ 2ε}. Graphically, one
can look at the sequence of real numbers v(sn). The stopping times up (for
p even) tell us when this sequence jumps above 2ε, and the stopping times
up (for p odd) tell us when this sequence jumps below ε.
Deﬁne σ = xu2σ∗u3xu4σ∗u5 ··· as: play x from u1 to u2, play σ∗(su2)
from u2 to u3, x from u3 to u4, σ∗(su4) from u4 to u5, and so on. We prove
below that σ is ε-optimal. In the next section, we show that it uniformly
guarantees v − ε if S \ Sε is ﬁnite.
In Lemma 24, we prove a submartingale property for the sequence (v(smin(t,up))p.
Fix τ ∈ T and set for simplicity P = Ps,σ,τ, E = Es,σ,τ.
Lemma 24 For every p ∈ N,
E[v(smin(t,up+1))|Hmin(t,up)] ≥ v(smin(t,up)) − ε21t>up.
on the event min(t,up) < +∞.
Observe ﬁrst that by Lemma 18, P(u2p < t,min(t,u2p+1) = +∞) = 0.
Observe also that since x is optimal in the local game, (v(sn)) is a sub-
martingale between min(t,u2p+1) and min(t,u2p+2)) for every p. Therefore,
on the event {u2p+1 < +∞ = t = u2p+2}, v(s∞) = limn v(sn) exists. Thus,
the conditional expectation on the left-hand side is meaningful.
14Proof. For even p, on the event t > up.
E[v(smin(t,up+1))|Hmin(t,up)] = Esup,σ∗(sup),τ
hup[v(˜ t)] ≥ v(sup) − ε2
Let now p be odd. Between min(t,up) and min(t,up+1), (v(sn))n is a
submartingale. Therefore E[v(smin(t,up+1))|Hmin(t,up)] ≥ v(smin(t,up)) by the
sampling theorem.
Since v(su2p) ≥ 2ε and v(su2p+1) ≤ ε, N = sup{p ≥ 1,u2p < +∞} is the
number of upcrossings of the interval [ε,2ε] by the sequence (v(sn))n. An
easy adaptation of the standard result on upcrossings (see Rosenberg and
Vieille (1998), Proposition 3) gives
E[N] ≤ 1/(ε − ε2). (1)
Set ˜ vp = v(smin(t,up)) + ε2˜ p, where ˜ p = p if t > up, and ˜ p = sup{k ≥
1,uk < t} otherwise. By Lemma 24, (˜ vp) is a submartingale. Moreover,
by (1) and since |v(sn)| ≤ 1, one has supp |˜ vp| ∈ L1. Therefore, (˜ vp)
converges P-a.s. and therefore (v(smin(t,up))) converges as well. Denote
v(s∞) = limp→∞ v(smin(t,up)).
Once again, by deﬁnition of σ∗, one has P-a.s. u2p+1 < +∞ on the
event u2p < +∞ = t. Therefore, on the event t = +∞ one has v(s∞) =
v(su2p+1) ≤ ε for some p ∈ N.
Proposition 25 σ guarantees v.
Proof. Recall that N = sup{p ≥ 1,u2p < +∞}. One has E[˜ v∞] ≥ ˜ v1,
which reads E[v(s∞)] ≥ v(s) − ε2E[N]. On the event {t < +∞}, v(s∞) =
g(st). On the event {t = +∞}, v(s∞) ≤ ε P-a.s. Thus,





We prove in this section Theorem 10. Thus, we assume that S is countable,
A and B are ﬁnite, and that for some a > 0, the set {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ a} is ﬁnite.
Fix ε ∈ (0,a/2) such that 2/ε2 is an integer for the rest of the section. The
15set S\Sε deﬁned in the previous section is also ﬁnite. We investigate the
properties of the strategy ¯ σ that has been deﬁned in the previous section.
We prove (Proposition 26) that under a terminating strategy, termina-
tion occurs in fact in bounded time.
Proposition 26 Let s ∈ S be ﬁxed and σ ∈ S be a terminating strategy.
For every η > 0, there exists N ∈ N, such that
∀τ ∈ T ,Ps,σ,τ(t ≤ N) > 1 − η.
Proof. Assume that the result does not hold for some η > 0. Then, for
each N ∈ N, there exists a pure strategy τN such that Ps,σ,τN(t ≤ N) ≤
1 − η. Obviously,
∀N0 ≥ N, Ps,σ,τN0(t ≤ N) ≤ 1 − η. (2)
Since A and B are ﬁnite and S is countable, there exists a ﬁnite subset ΩN
of Ω such that, for every τ,
Ps,σN,τ(∀n ≤ N, sn ∈ ΩN) ≥ 1 − η/2.
Clearly, one may choose the sequence (ΩN)N to be non-decreasing. For each
N, we partition the set of pure strategies of player 2 as follows: τ1 and τ2
in T are considered equivalent if they coincide on every history of length at
most N − 1 which visits only states in ΩN: τ1 'N τ2 if, for every n ≤ N,
and every hn = (s1,a1,b1,... ,sn) ∈ Hn, one has τ1(hn) = τ2(hn) as soon as
s0,s1,... ,sn ∈ ΩN. Since ΩN,A and B are ﬁnite, the number of equivalence
classes for the relation 'N is ﬁnite. Notice that, if τ1 'N τ2, one has
|Ps,σ,τ1(t ≤ N) − Ps,σ,τ2(t ≤ N)| ≤ Ps,σ,τ1(∃n ≤ N,sn / ∈ ΩN) ≤ η/2
(3)
Since (ΩN) is non-decreasing, the partition into equivalence classes for 'N+1
reﬁnes the partition obtained for 'N. Therefore, one can construct a decreas-
ing sequence (eN)N of equivalence classes for ('N),3 such that for each N,
eN contains inﬁnitely many of the strategies (τp)p≥N. By this procedure,
one gets a pure strategy τ such that for every N there exists N0 ≥ N with
τ 'N τN0. From (2) and (3) one obtains Ps,σ,τ(t ≤ N) ≤ 1 − η/2 for every
N. This contradicts the fact that σ is terminating.
3That is, each eN is an equivalence class for 'N.
164.1 Player 1 can uniformly guarantee v
We show that, in this case, the strategy σ that we deﬁned in the previous
section is uniformly ε-optimal. We ﬁrst sketch the idea. Since A,B and
S \ Sε are ﬁnite, there exists a ﬁnite subset S1 of Sε such that Ps,σ,τ(su2 / ∈
S1,u2 < +∞) ≤ ε3, for every s ∈ S \ Sε, every σ ∈ S and every τ ∈ T . For
each s ∈ Sε there exists Ns ∈ N such that Ps,σ∗(s),τ(˜ t > Ns) ≤ ε3 for every
τ ∈ T . Since S1 is ﬁnite, N1 = maxS1 Ns is ﬁnite.
This is used in the following way. Deﬁne an excursion above 2ε (an
excursion in short) as the play between u2p and u2p+1, for any p such that
u2p < +∞ (recall that these are stages where player 1 follows σ∗(s2p)). One
of the arguments of the previous section was that the expected number of
excursions is at most 2/ε. Therefore, the probability that the total number
of excursions during the play exceeds 1/ε2 is small. By deﬁnition of S1, the
probability that the number of excursions does not exceed 1/ε2 and each of
the excursions starts in S1 is close to 1. Now, given an excursion starts from
S1, the probability that it lasts more than N1 stages is small. Therefore,
the probability that the total number of excursions does not exceed 1/ε2
and that no excursion exceeds N1 stages is close to 1. This implies that,
provided n is large, the expected frequency of stages which belong to an
excursion is small. This is a crucial observation which allows to compare
the average of E[v(sn)] over the ﬁrst n stages to the expected average payoﬀ
received up to stage n.
We put this in formal terms. For n ∈ N, deﬁne
An = {u2p ≤ n < min(t,u2p+1),u2p < t, for some p} ⊆ H∞.
These are all inﬁnite plays where stage n is in an excursion.






Proof. Since E[N] ≤ 2/ε, one has P(N ≥ 1/ε2) ≤ 2ε. By deﬁnition of
S1,
P(u2/ε2 < +∞,su2k / ∈ S1 for some k ≤ 1/ε2) ≤ 1 − (1 − ε3)1/ε2
≤ 2ε.
Denote by dp = min(u2p+1,t) − u2p if u2p < t, dp = 0 otherwise, the length
of the p-th excursion. Any excursion which starts in S1 does not exceed N1
in length, with high probability:
Ps,σ,τ(dp > N1|su2p ∈ S1,u2p < t) ≤ ε3.
17Therefore,
Ps,σ,τ(u2/ε2 < t,dp > N1 for some p ≤ 1/ε2) ≤ 4ε.
Denote E = {u2/ε2 < t,dp > N1 for some p ≤ 1/ε2}, and by D =
P+∞
p=0 dp >





Ps,σ,τ(Ak ∩ Ec) ≤ N1/ε2.
One deduces that 1
n
Pn
k=1 Ps,σ,τ(Ak) ≤ 6ε+ N1
nε2, which yields the result.
Proposition 28 The strategy σ uniformly guarantees v − 16ε.
Proof. We rewrite the submartingale property of (v(sn)) a bit diﬀer-
ently. Our goal is to explicit an estimate of E[v(sn)] in terms of v(s) (see
inequality (4) below). Fix n0 ≥ 1 and for p ∈ N set
Xp = v(smin(t,up,n0))












≥ v(smin(t,u2p)) − ε2 if u2p < t.
If u2p < min(n0,t), X2p+1 coincides with v(smin(t,u2p+1)), except possibly if





≥ X2p − ε21u2p<min(t,n)







By taking expectations and letting p go to inﬁnity, these inequalities yield
E[v(sn0)] ≥ v(s) − ε2E[N] − 2P(An0) (4)
18Observe now that gn ≥ v(sn)−ε, except on ∪kAk. One deduces that for














P(Ak) ≥ v(s) − 16ε,
where the second inequality uses (4) and Lemma 27.
Remark 29 Notice that the ﬁniteness of the set {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ 2ε} is needed
only to ensure the existence of the ﬁnite set S1 ⊆ S2ε. In particular, our
proof works also if Sε is ﬁnite and {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ 2ε} countable.
4.2 Player 2 can uniformly guarantee v
We prove here that player 2 can uniformly guarantee v. For ε > 0, deﬁne
Sε = {s ∈ S,v(s) ≤ −ε}, Tε = T ∪ {s ∈ S,v(s) > −ε}, and denote Γε the
recursive game in which the set of absorbing states is Tε and the payoﬀ in
s ∈ Tε is v(s). By Proposition 17, there is a terminating strategy of player
2, which uniformly guarantees v +ε2 in the game Γε. By Remark 29 player
2 uniformly guarantees v.
It is not diﬃcult to show that the stationary strategy deﬁned as:
• Play yλ on Sε (an optimal strategy in the discounted game).
• Play y (limit of discounted optimal strategies) on Tε.
uniformly guarantees v − ε, provided λ is close enough to zero. This
strategy was used by Thuijsman and Vrieze (1992) for the case |S| < +∞.
5 Positive Recursive Games
In this section we prove Theorem 12.
Proof. First we note that for every ﬁxed state s ∈ S and every pair of








and all terms are non-negative. We conclude that vλ(s) is increasing in λ.
Deﬁne w(s) = supλ vλ(s). We claim that w is the uniform value. We ﬁrst
check that player 1 can uniformly guarantee w.
19Let ε ∈ (0,1) and an initial state s be given. Choose λ ∈ (0,1) such that
vλ(s) ≥ w(s)−ε/4, and choose an ε/4-optimal strategy σ in the λ-discounted
game. Let N1 = N1(λ,ε) be suﬃciently large such that (1 − λ)N1 ≤ ε/4.
Since g is bounded by 1,
Es,σ,τ[1t<N1gt] ≥ Es,σ,τ[1t<N1(1 − λ)t−1gt] ≥ γλ(s,σ,τ) − ε/4.
Let N2 ≥ 4N1/ε. Then for every n ≥ N2
γn(s,σ,τ) ≥ Es,σ,τ[1t<N1gt] − ε/4
≥ γλ(s,σ,τ) − ε/2
≥ vλ(s,σ,τ) − 3ε/4
≥ w(s) − ε.
Therefore, player 1 can uniformly guarantee w.
We shall now construct a strategy for player 2 that uniformly guarantees
w(s) + 2ε, given any initial state s. Denote for every n ∈ N, εn = ε/2n.
Deﬁne a strategy τ∗ for player 2 as follows. At stage n, play the mixed
action yεn
sn. By (iii),
γn(s,σ,τ∗) ≤ Es,σ,τ∗[gn] ≤ Es,σ,τ∗[w(sn)] ≤ w(s1) + 2ε,
as desired.
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